Rape as a Weapon of Genocide: Gender, Patriarchy, and Sexual Violence in the Rwandan Genocide by Burnet, Jennie E.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Anthropology Faculty Publications Department of Anthropology
2015
Rape as a Weapon of Genocide: Gender, Patriarchy,
and Sexual Violence in the Rwandan Genocide
Jennie E. Burnet
Georgia State University, jburnet@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/anthro_facpub
Part of the Anthropology Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Anthropology at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Anthropology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For
more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burnet, Jennie E., "Rape as a Weapon of Genocide: Gender, Patriarchy, and Sexual Violence in the Rwandan Genocide" (2015).




Rape as a Weapon of Genocide: Gender, Patriarchy, and Sexual Violence in Rwanda 
 
by Jennie E. Burnet, Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Louisville 
 
During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda genocide planners and perpetrators used sexual 
torture, mutilation, and enslavement as weapons of genocide against Tutsi women and girls. An 
epidemiological survey of women in Rwanda in 1994 found that 49 percent of them had been 
raped.1 The genocide (6 April- 4 July 1994) was an intense episode of violence that occurred 
during a decade of violent conflict, beginning with the civil war (1990‒1994), continuing with 
the exile of more than two million Rwandans in refugee camps in eastern Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) and western Tanzania (1994‒1996), and ending with the insurgency in 
northwestern Rwanda (1997‒2000). This decade was characterized by high rates of sexual 
violence and militarized sex, defined here as voluntary and coerced sexual relations between 
soldiers or members of paramilitary organizations and civilians, but the 1994 genocide 
constituted an abrupt break from social norms, especially in terms of sexual assault. Sexual 
violence in the genocide ranged beyond ethnic/racial dyads of Tutsi-victim and Hutu-perpetrator. 
Many Hutu women and girls also endured sexual violence in 1994, and an unknown number of 
women and girls of all ethnicities were pressured into sexual relationships with soldiers after 
they reached the safety of internally displaced persons camps in territory held by the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF). Focusing solely on sexual violence committed by Hutu perpetrators 
against Tutsi victims obscures the complexity of sexual violence, sexual agency, and militarized 
sex during conflict.  
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Research on sexual violence in Rwanda has emphasized rape and other forms of sexual 
violence as conscious strategies on the part of the perpetrators to terrorize and control women, 
girls, and other civilians.2 Adding to these important contributions, this chapter explores how 
pregenocide social contexts and the political economy shaped sexual violence during the 
genocide and influenced the impact of sexual violence on survivors, families, and communities 
in the aftermath of the genocide. This chapter is based on ethnographic research conducted in 
urban and rural Rwanda between 1997 and 2013, including more than a hundred formal 
interviews with leaders and members of women’s civil society organizations and several hundred 
ethnographic interviews with ordinary citizens in rural and urban Rwanda. This research focused 
broadly on changing gender roles in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide and did not focus 
exclusively on sexual violence or its legacies.3 
The chapter is organized in five sections. In the first, I examine the political economy of 
everyday gender violence in Rwanda and the ways in which the decisions of women and girls 
have been shaped by, what Eric Wolf calls, ‘a social field of action’ that make some behaviors 
impossible and some behaviors more possible than others.4 Then I examine how women in 
conflict zones exercise sexual agency in ways that challenge distinctions between consensual and 
nonconsensual sex on which international legal definitions of rape are based. Women’s choices 
are limited—sometimes impossibly limited—but they still exercise their agency to survive and to 
pursue life goals, such as education or a career, marriage, or motherhood. In the third section, I 
describe how perpetrators used rape as a weapon of genocide and explain the ways that the local 
political economy, cultural symbolism, Rwandan notions of sexual consent and gender roles 
shaped sexual violence during the 1994 genocide. Then I explore the short and long term impact 
of sexual violence on survivors, their families, and their communities. In the conclusion, I 
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discuss the ways in which certain sexual violence survivors have either been silenced or chose to 
remain silent about their experiences of sexual assault.  
 
The Political Economy of Everyday Gender Violence 
In her groundbreaking study of Korean ‘comfort women,’ C. Sarah Soh highlighted the 
importance of situating sexual violence associated with war within the context of ‘everyday 
gender violence’ and the ‘structural power’ of the political economy.5 With the exception of 
Meredeth Turshen’s comparative analysis of sexual violence in Rwanda and Mozambique, few 
works have situated the sexual violence of the 1994 genocide in the context of everyday gender 
violence or the structural context of the political economy.6 Long before the 1994 genocide 
Rwandan women and girls faced a great deal of gender violence, including physical violence 
(such as domestic abuse and sexual assault) and structural violence (such as gender 
discrimination). 
Patrilineages were the fundamental structuring element of society in precolonial Rwanda. 
Patrilineages operated as corporations that managed the economic and social well-being of its 
members, whether male or female. Widows, married women, and unmarried girls derived their 
social identities and rights to land from their male kin. A Rwandan proverb states ‘Abagore 
ntibafite ubwoko’—wives have no identity; meaning an unmarried girl has the same identity as 
her father or brothers, and a wife takes on the identity of her husband and his patrilineage.7 In 
short, a woman’s membership in a lineage defined who she was as a social person. During 
precolonial and colonial times a woman after her marriage would be called by a name derived 
from her husband’s name such as Mukamanzi (literally, ‘wife of Manzi’) or some other 
anonymous kinship term such as umufasha (literally, ‘helper,’ meaning wife) or 
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mama/nyoko/nyina (literally, ‘my mother’/ ‘your mother’ / ‘his/her mother’). A woman’s given 
name was rarely used—a literal, as well as symbolic, erasure of her individuated personhood. 
These practices were not necessarily based in patriarchy. Rather, they reflected a Rwandan 
notion of personhood whereby a person’s kin relations, stage of life, and marital status 
constituted his or her social identity. 
Female labor was at the center of Rwandan agricultural production in the precolonial and 
colonial periods. With the exception of a few regional ethnic groups and the ruling elite, most 
households, whether Hutu or Tutsi, subsisted primarily from agriculture, with livestock 
supplementing agricultural production. Up until the recent past, wives cultivated food for the 
household on land owned by their husbands or their husbands’ family. Husbands produced cash 
crops, managed livestock, or migrated in search of paid labor. In the precolonial system, women 
and girls drew power from their productive and reproductive capacities and from the protection 
of their own patrilineage. In this system, women could carve out substantial spheres of power. 
Women also had land rights in their own lineages. A father could make gifts of land to a 
daughter; this land ‘remained the outright property of the woman and [was] inherited by her 
sons.’8 Should a woman never marry or should her marriage fail, she could return to her own 
patrilineage and be allocated a parcel of land.9 Bridewealth marriages were central to this social 
configuration and helped ensure protection for married daughters. The colonial period wrought 
many changes in Rwandan gender roles as the economy became monetized and the colonial state 
pushed husbands and men into the cash economy. These changes weakened the customary 




Although women gained some legal rights in the postcolonial period, they remained 
subordinated to men and largely excluded from nonagricultural, salaried work. The 1991 
constitution guaranteed the equality of all people before the law regardless of race, color, origin, 
ethnicity, clan, sex, belief, religion, or social position, but numerous legal codes of the 
postcolonial period continued to subordinate women to men in the home and in the public 
sphere.11 For example, Article 206 of Law no. 42/88 stated that ‘the husband is the head of the 
conjugal community made up of man, wife, and their children.12 This provision was inspired, 
according to Jean-Marie Kamatali and Philippe Gafishi, ‘by custom, which defines the husband 
in reference to his physical strength and his duty to provide for the family’s needs including their 
lodging.’13 At the time of the genocide in 1994 Rwandan women were technically, legally 
emancipated. In practice, however, they were perceived as legal ‘minors [under] the 
guardianship of fathers, brothers, husbands or sons.’14 Banking, commercial, and land ownership 
laws limited women’s ability to engage in the cash economy. Women told me in interviews that 
prior to 1994 they could not seek salaried work without the approval of their husbands even 
though Rwandan law did not require employers to seek husbands’ approval.15 By law, women 
needed the signature of their husbands in order to open a bank account.16 This legal requirement 
was intended to protect the conjugal household as a single, economic unit. But, the provision 
made it easy for husbands to hide money from their wives or direct resources away from the 
conjugal household since husbands did not require a wife’s signature to open or close a bank 
account but a wife did. While some women became successful entrepreneurs, their businesses 
were vulnerable to plunder by their husbands.17  
Patriarchal ideas about the roles of women in society also led to an education system that 
limited access to secondary school for girls. According to World Bank Development Indicators, 
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in 1990 the ratio of female to male primary enrollment was ninety-six percent for primary 
school, seventy-one percent for secondary school, and only twenty-two percent for tertiary 
school. When faced with limited household resources, families chose to educate their sons over 
daughters for two reasons. First, girl children provided significant labor in the household by 
fetching water, caring for young children, cooking, cleaning, and washing laundry. This time-
intensive work required girls to miss school. On the other hand, boys’ labor, usually tending 
livestock or helping in the fields, could be accomplished outside school hours. Second, fathers 
often viewed educating daughters as ‘a waste’ since these daughters would leave to join their 
husbands’ patrilineage when they married. Thus, many institutional barriers prevented girls from 
achieving the levels of education necessary to secure salaried work in the private sector or in the 
government.  
This history of everyday violence that subordinated women to men combined with a 
political economy that strongly favored men for salaried employment limited women and girls’ 
choices. Despite laws that granted them individual rights and personhood, women and girls were 
viewed as dependent on men: as girls they were dependent on their fathers, uncles, and 
grandfathers and as women on their husbands, brothers-in-law, and adult male children. This 
systemic subordination increased women and girls’ vulnerability to sexual violence in the 
genocide.  
 
Women’s Agency, Sexual Consent, and Conflict  
In the Rwandan context, the issue of sexual consent is a particularly thorny problem because 
Western legal definitions of consent are rarely appropriate.18 According to Sophie Day, rape is 
commonly defined as ‘nonconsensual sex’ or ‘nonconsensual sexual intercourse.’19 This 
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definition raises some significant conceptual problems when used in Rwanda (and many other 
African countries) because women in these cultures usually do not give explicit, verbal consent 
to sexual intercourse. Among Rwandans as well as many other African groups, modesty is a 
feminine ideal and unmarried girls and women are expected to uphold a cultural model of the 
‘modest virgin’ devoid of any sexual knowledge or urges.20 Because explicit expressions of 
sexual desire are considered immodest, female consent is usually signaled implicitly through 
nonverbal cues or ‘situational consent,’ that is, a woman or girl’s willingness to be in a particular 
place, at a particular time, with a particular person. For instance, a woman agrees to spend the 
night with a man in his home or a hotel. In the past and even to a certain extent today, a married 
woman would also give subtle nonverbal cues to her husband to indicate her desire by cooking a 
special meal, wearing attractive clothing, attending to the husband’s physical comfort, or lighting 
a pipe of tobacco for him at bedtime.21 Rwandan cultural values precluded the notion of rape in 
marriage because a wife’s consent became an irrevocable fact upon wedding.22 Wives could 
refuse their husbands only due to illness or menstruation.23 Thus the emic Rwandan cultural 
models of sexual consent do not coincide with the European and American models of consent. 
Research on socially acceptable forms of domestic violence in India24 and on socially acceptable 
forms of domestic violence in the highlands of Peru suggest that many other cultures also reject a 
model of rape based on consent.25  
Rwandan cultural models of sexuality and consent complicate investigations of sexual 
violence as a crime. For example, the lack of precise words for rape in Kinyarwanda (the local 
language) complicated research on sexual violence conducted in late 1994 and early 1995.26 
Article 360 of the 1977 Rwandan penal code defined rape as a crime punishable by five to ten 
years imprisonment, but it did not delineate what behaviors constituted rape.27 In unpublished 
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research on child sexual assault conducted in 2002 for CARE-Rwanda, I found that Rwandans 
usually expressed the concept of rape as ‘gufata ku ngufu (to take by force),’ which suggests that 
rape is conceived of as involving physical force. A former military policeman confirmed this 
when he explained to me in 2002 that he usually looked for signs of physical violence on an 
alleged victim’s body in order to determine whether she had been raped. He said there was 
simply no other conclusive way to determine whether a woman alleging sexual assault was being 
truthful.  
Historically, Rwandan cultural models of sexuality did not prescribe remedies for rape; 
rather, they addressed improper sexual relations such as adultery—a man having sexual 
intercourse with an unauthorized woman such as the wife of a different patrilineage or an 
unmarried girl. In these instances, the offending man’s patrilineage would offer gifts such as beer 
and livestock to compensate the lineage to which the wife or unmarried girl belonged. A wife 
caught en flagrant délit with an unauthorized man was assumed to have consented to the sexual 
activity. Most likely she faced a severe beating at the hands of her husband, father-in-law, or 
brothers-in-law, and risked being sent back to her own patrilineage without her children. For an 
unmarried girl, a marriage might be arranged, but if not she most likely faced a severe beating at 
the hands of her father or brothers for bringing shame to the family. Knowledge of her ‘mistake’ 
would also lower the potential bridewealth that her lineage could seek during future marriage 
negotiations. All these instances assume the implicit consent of the women involved and 
preclude the possibility of rape defined as ‘non-consensual sex.’ These data suggest that 
Rwandan cultural models for coping with sexual transgressions, including situations that were 
potentially rape, robbed women of their agency. 
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While a great deal of international attention has focused on sexual violence in conflict 
zones, few studies recognize that many different types of sexual encounters occur in war zones, 
including a great deal of consensual sex for pleasure and transactional sex that does not 
necessarily constitute harm.28 Many of these encounters, to be sure, are conditioned by the 
circumstances of violent conflict and the political economy of war and are therefore hard to 
define as non-coercive. Many young women exercise their sexual agency in conflict zones and 
trade sexual access to their bodies for the means of survival: food, water, clothing, money. The 
degree to which these women are making a ‘choice’ is highly contingent on the structural factors 
determined by the conflict, and often they must choose between several terrible options—what 
Begoña Aretxaga called ‘choiceless decisions.’29 In Rwanda the lack of explicit consent further 
complicated these distinctions: how do women and girls refuse sexual intercourse when the 
means of survival are bound up with implicit signs of consent, such as accepting food, clothing, 
shelter, and protection? R. M. Hayden critiques assumptions by human rights researchers that 
Rwandan women who married men in exchange for protection during the genocide were victims 
of rape or forced marriage.30 Indeed, it is plausible that some Rwandan women and girls 
exercised agency in the initiation of these relations, and it is highly likely that they have 
exercised agency in their continuation. Yet whether these relationships can be considered 
consensual or whether they constitute sexual harm is a much more difficult question to answer. If 
the only other option is death, is it really a choice at all? 
 
Sexual Violence during the 1994 Genocide 
Sexual assaults on women and girls increased dramatically following the advent of the civil war 
in 1990.31 While it is almost certain that rape and sexual violence existed before then, they were 
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not widely recognized as problems, and women’s organizations did not mobilize on the issue. 
The civil war, the 1994 genocide, and their aftermath transformed aspects of Rwandan culture. In 
Rwanda in the 1990s, war became what Stephen Lubkemann called a ‘social condition,’ meaning 
war became the normal context of daily life rather than a disruption of normal social relations.32 
Before, during, and after the genocide, sexual violence was a common feature of a social 
landscape that already considered many forms of gender-based violence, such as wife-beating, 
normal. 
As the general state of security in the country declined, members of the Interahamwe and 
Impuzamugambi militias, the Rwandan Armed Forced (FAR), and others took advantage of the 
chaotic conditions to commit acts of sexual violence with impunity. Local government officials 
advised women to wear both shorts and underwear beneath their skirts as an impediment to rape 
rather than wearing nothing per custom.33 While official reports of rape were almost nonexistent, 
Human Rights Watch reported in 1993, ‘Rwandan soldiers frequently rape women, but because 
they are never punished for the crime, victims rarely report the attacks. Women know that to 
accuse soldiers is futile and may well lead to further harassment or even death.’34 Many 
Rwandans, both male and female, told me that the FAR and the militias raped women during 
attacks on civilians in the civil war. 
While sexual violence escalated during the civil war, its ferocity and intensity during the 
genocide from 6 April through 4 July 1994, constituted an abrupt break with social norms. Rape 
and sexual violence became weapons of genocide used to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group as well 
as ‘to terrorize the community and warn all people of the futility of resistance—those targeted as 
victims as well as those who might wish to protect the intended targets.’35 Women faced brutal 
acts of sexual violence: individual rape, gang rape, rape with objects, sexual slavery or ‘forced 
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marriage,’ and sexual mutilation.36 Interahamwe militiamen often raped or sexually tortured 
Tutsi women before killing them. Perpetrators sometimes mutilated women during the rapes or 
before killing them by cutting off their breasts, puncturing the vagina with sharp objects, or 
disfiguring body parts that looked ‘Tutsi’ such as long fingers or thin noses.37 In other cases, 
Tutsi women were gang raped, sexually enslaved or ‘married’ by Interahamwe militiamen in 
exchange for having their lives saved. 38 
Although perpetrators in the 1994 genocide targeted victims based on ascribed identities, 
so-called ‘age-old’ ethnic hatred (or tribalism) was not the cause of the genocide.39 Rather, the 
killings were the result of political strategizing and conscious choices by a political and 
economic elite who desired to maintain their hold on power. At the local level, community 
members usually knew the ethnicity of their neighbors. At roadblocks on main roads, policemen, 
soldiers, and militiamen used national identity cards, which indicated ethnicity, to select targets. 
During the genocide a man who presented an identity card marked ‘Tutsi’ would be killed 
instantly along with any children accompanying him. Women with Tutsi identity cards would 
usually be killed immediately or raped and then killed. Sometimes they might be spared 
according to the whims of their attackers, held as sexual slaves by soldiers or militiamen, or 
taken as ‘wives’ by individual soldiers, militiamen, or civilian perpetrators. Individuals 
presenting identity cards marked ‘Hutu’ or ‘Twa’ would often be physically examined or 
interrogated for other clues to determine if the card was accurate. Many people had changed the 
ethnicity on their cards from Tutsi to Hutu during the Habyarimana regime because doing so was 
advantageous under the ‘ethnic equilibrium’ policy, which reserved ninety percent of all posts in 
the government and in secondary schools or universities for Hutus. Thus, genocide perpetrators 
relied in many instances on stereotypical physical markers of ‘Tutsiness,’ which included a tall, 
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slender frame; aquiline nose with small nostrils; long, narrow fingers or feet; dark gums in the 
mouth; and a tan skin tone on the palms of the hands or soles of the feet. For women, the rule of 
thumb was often beauty. Since colonial times, Tutsi (or Watussi) women were heralded as great 
beauties by European colonizers. Racist propaganda in the years leading up to the genocide 
further reinforced these stereotypes.40 Beauty as a marker of Tutsi-ness was so strong in the 
popular imagination that Hutu women and girls who were considered beautiful risked being 
mistaken for Tutsi and raped, sexually enslaved or taken as ‘wives,’ sexually tortured, or killed.41  
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established sexual violence as an 
explicit strategy of the genocide and yielded the first judgment of rape as a genocide crime in an 
international court. The ICTR convicted Jean-Paul Akayesu, Burgomaster (mayor) of Taba 
commune, of using rape as a weapon of genocide even though he did not participate in sexual 
violence. Instead, he ordered others to rape and engage in sexual violence as part of the 
genocide.42 Other leaders ordered militiamen and other community members to rape and also 
committed rape themselves.43 In 2011, the ICTR found Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, a woman and 
Minister of Women’s Development in the interim government in power during the genocide, 
responsible for aiding and abetting rapes and ordering the rape of Tutsi women during the 
genocide.44 Unfortunately, due to errors committed during the trial by the prosecutor’s office, the 
court did not find her guilty of rape as a crime of genocide.45   
Beyond physical brutality, sexual violence in the genocide consisted of symbolic and 
psychosocial violence. Perpetrators targeted the normally privileged role of Rwandan women as 
mothers. They disemboweled pregnant women while still alive and cut their fetuses out of their 
wombs.46 They raped and sexually mutilated women and then told them bullets should not be 
‘wasted’ on them because they would ‘die of AIDS,’ presumably contracted during the rapes.47 
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Extremist rhetoric targeted Tutsi beauty and desirability—militiamen were promised the 
opportunity for sexual intercourse with Tutsi women as a reward for their ‘work,’ that is killing 
Tutsis and others identified as enemies of the state. Survivors frequently reported that 
perpetrators said that they wanted ‘to see if Tutsi women were like Hutu women.’48 Many 
perpetrators raped Tutsi women as punishment for ‘their supposed arrogance’ since Tutsi women 
were ‘said to scorn Hutu men.’49  
Rape during the genocide also became a political economic weapon. The Rwandan state 
sought to eliminate the Tutsi ethnic group through the destruction or systematic stripping of 
assets. Tutsi homes and businesses were looted and burned; soldiers, militiamen, and civilian 
perpetrators were ‘rewarded’ for their work with property taken from Tutsis. Within this context, 
Tutsi women and girls were often treated as war booty or property.50 For example, Rwandan 
soldiers ordered the director of a nursing school to hand over female students and raped female 
employees of a Roman Catholic seminary as ‘a contribution to the war effort.’51 In some 
communities, local authorities worked to keep the Tutsi wives of Hutu men alive only because 
‘depriving a man of the productive and reproductive capacities of his wife harmed his interests’ 
and could diminish his willingness to support the genocide.52 Women’s land rights were 
sometimes part of the ‘reward’ for militiamen. One survivor recounted how the head of the local 
militia gave her and her sisters to militiamen as ‘wives’ and their father’s land was split among 
the ‘husbands.’53 Women and girls greater survival rates can in part be explained through this use 
of women and girls as economic pawns to acquire land and property through so-called 
‘marriage.’   
After the genocide, sexual violence remained a problem. For Rwandans in refugee camps 
in eastern Zaire or western Tanzania, the former FAR soldiers and Interahamwe militiamen who 
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controlled the camps remained a constant threat. Rape was common, and perpetrators faced no 
consequences. Young, single women and adolescent girls remained vulnerable to becoming 
‘wives’ under coercive circumstances.54  The FAR and Interahamwe in eastern Zaire organized 
incursions into Rwanda and attacked local communities, again using rape as a weapon.  
The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed wing of the RPF that became the new 
national army following the RPF victory, was much more disciplined than the FAR had been. 
RPA soldiers did not engage in widespread rape, but two practices fall somewhere in the vicinity 
of coercive sex and definitely constitute militarized sex. In the internally displaced persons 
camps behind RPA lines, women and girls who had been saved by the RPA would often find 
themselves solicited by RPA soldiers for a ‘reward’ (meaning sexual intercourse). This reward 
was often referred to as kubohoza, ‘to be liberated.’ While these women and girls may have 
consented to these sexual encounters, it is difficult to discern whether they felt as if they had a 
choice. In a second practice, RPA soldiers asked Tutsi women married to Hutu men to leave their 
husbands, ‘saying those marriages must have been the consequence of rape.’55 If the women 
refused, their husbands would be arrested on accusations of genocide and imprisoned—an almost 
certain death warrant between 1994 and 1997 given the abysmal prison conditions. The women 
were then forced to marry RPA soldiers, who acquired the woman’s property.56  
Little detailed information about sexual violence during the insurgency in northern and 
western Rwanda (1996-2001) is available because researchers had little access to these 
communities at the time. Survivors of attacks against civilians, particularly those perpetrated by 
the RPA, were reluctant to testify for fear of reprisals from the government. For several years 
after the end of the insurgency, Rwandan women in northwestern Rwanda cited rape as a 
pressing social problem for women and girls.57 These data suggest that sexual violence was a 
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significant problem during the insurgency and in its aftermath. By 2009, women in the same 
community stated that local authorities had solved the problem by working closely with the 
population.58  
 
The Aftermaths of Sexual Violence 
Human Rights Watch published the earliest, in depth, examination of sexual violence during the 
1994 genocide and its aftermath.59 The report detailed the numerous economic, legal and social 
problems faced by sexual violence survivors. Its analysis of the forms of sexual violence in the 
genocide helped establish that sexual violence was an intentional strategy of genocide. Research 
by Médecins sans Frontières also helped establish that sexual violence had been used as a 
weapon in the genocide.60 As a result of this ground-breaking work, an international coalition of 
feminist human rights lawyers, scholars, and activists petitioned the ICTR’s prosecutor’s office 
to pursue prosecution of rape and sexual violence as genocide crimes and crimes against 
humanity.61 Their advocacy and the amicus brief they filed led to the amendment of the charges 
against Jean-Paul Akayesu and the first successful prosecution of rape as a weapon of genocide 
under international law. 
Ten years after its first report on sexual violence, Human Rights Watch revisited the 
situation of sexual violence survivors and the obstacles that prevented them from seeking 
justice.62 The report acknowledged the important international legal precedents as well as 
improvements in national legal codes to protect civilians from sexual violence, but it made clear 
that numerous obstacles continued to prevent the prosecution of many cases of sexual violence. 
Several foreign and Rwandan scholars have collected testimony or life history narratives from 
sexual violence survivors.63 These works have contributed to understanding some of the long-
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term consequences of sexual violence for survivors. Three significant themes that emerge from 
these studies are the psycho-social difficulties of raising children born of rape, the health 
consequences of living with HIV acquired through sexual violence, and the continuing economic 
struggles of rape survivors who are often living in poverty.  
Many women and girls who were raped became pregnant. While abortion was illegal in 
Rwanda in 1994, in some hospitals and medical clinics nurses and physicians quietly offered an 
unknown number of these women abortions as treatment for their physical and psychological 
trauma.64 Nonetheless, a significant number of women and girls gave birth to children who were 
commonly called ‘children of bad memories’ in Kinyarwanda. Many of these women and girls 
faced extreme emotional difficulty. As one widow explained, ‘I can’t look in this child’s eyes.’65 
Another woman, forced to marry an FAR soldier during the genocide and to accompany him into 
exile, explained, ‘I gave birth to a girl, but I hated her, because she was a constant reminder of 
what had happened to me. I didn’t breastfeed her because of that.’66  
Some women left these children in orphanages, but thousands of others kept them. As 
Godelieve Mukasarasi, founder and coordinator of a Rwanda women’s organization dedicated to 
helping sexual violence survivors and their children, explains, ‘Children born of rape are 
stigmatized, hated even by their own mothers or by their mother’s kin.’67 These children remain 
as external embodied memories for their mothers who must face a lifetime of public shame 
because their kin and communities recognize the mother’s defilement in the face of the child. 
Attempting to disguise children born of rape as illegitimate children offers these women little 
advantage since having an illegitimate child drastically reduces the chance of a woman entering 
into a socially recognized marriage and social adulthood.68 Thus, women impregnated through 
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rape during the genocide, the civil war, or their aftermaths found themselves with only terrible 
choices.  
Despite these obstacles, children born of rape become central to some sexual violence 
survivors’ agency: these survivors redefined themselves as mothers and made decisions to 
protect the well-being of their children. In Rwanda as elsewhere in Africa, motherhood is the 
best light in which a woman can be seen. By re-inventing themselves as mothers, albeit single 
mothers, these rape survivors recovered their dignity and reclaimed their agency.69 The radically 
transformed social context wrought by the genocide made this option more practical. In the 
aftermath of the genocide, single motherhood became less stigmatized and parents became less 
willing to enforce customary sanctions, such as pregnant daughters’ banishment or sending the 
infants to orphanages. In the years that followed the genocide, the increasing difficulty for 
Rwandan youth to achieve socially recognized marriages resulted in increasing numbers of 
single mothers in Rwanda.70  Because families and communities have no other choice, they 
began to accommodate single mothers, including women raped in the genocide, by according 
them social adulthood. Nonetheless, sexual violence survivors impregnated through rape faced 
the additional challenge of learning to love children who embodied their physical and 
psychology trauma. As one rape survivor explained, ‘Learning to love the child of a killer is 
hard. … SEVOTA [a women’s association] helped me learn to love him.’71 Not all women 
succeed in this endeavor. As one woman, who was only twelve years old at the time of her rape 
and sexual captivity during the genocide, explained, ‘I have never loved my daughter, who was 
born out of rape, and even though I try my hardest to love her, there is still a long way to go.’72 
Women and girls who contracted HIV/AIDS through sexual assault during the genocide 
were viewed and continue to be viewed today as tainted. During the genocide, men who knew 
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they were infected with HIV raped women to inflict a delayed death.73 Beyond the public shame 
of their rapes, these women faced the structural violence of living with a devastating illness in a 
resource-poor setting where treatment was unavailable in the critical years after the genocide. As 
African Rights reported, ‘medical care for genocide rape victims in Rwanda can be summarized 
as “too little, too late.”’74 In the late 1990s through 2004, anti-retroviral treatments (ARVs) 
available to people living with HIV/AIDS in North America and Europe were only available to 
the very wealthy in Rwanda as the medications’ monthly cost exceeded $400 whereas the per 
capita gross national income in Rwanda was $730 per year (or $60 per month) in 2004.75 The 
vast majority of people living with HIV/AIDS in Rwanda went untreated until the U.S. 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was created by President George W. 
Bush in 2003. Beginning in late 2004, ARV therapy began to be made accessible to poor 
Rwandans. Unfortunately, this treatment came too late for thousands of women who had already 
died of HIV/AIDS acquired through rape in the genocide. Nonetheless, in 2011 an estimated 
61,900 Rwandans received ARV therapy and 225,600 people living with HIV/AIDS received 
health care and other support through the PEPFAR initiative.76  
Survivors of rape shared many of the same difficulties of genocide survivors in general: 
loneliness, social marginalization, depression, psycho-social trauma or post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and extreme poverty. In the aftermath of the genocide, survivors faced a country whose 
infrastructure had been destroyed. Perpetrators had targeted the economic lives of Tutsis by 
destroying their homes, slaughtering their livestock, and stealing their belongings. Thus, 
genocide survivors faced restarting their lives from ‘less than nothing.’77 In this context, 
survivors of sexual violence found their suffering intensified by the dire economic circumstances 
and poverty they faced. While the new Rwandan government eventually came to the assistance 
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of genocide survivors through the Genocide Survivors’ Assistance Funds, known by their French 
acronym, FARG; survivors suffered for many years without the basic necessities such as 
clothing, shelter, basic household tools, or farming implements necessary to survive. For sexual 
violence victims, many of whom suffered health problems as a result of their attacks, this 
poverty made it extremely difficult to access basic health care.  
Despite these challenges, women survivors of sexual violence rebuilt their lives and 
began to seek meaning in their existence. M. Zraly and L. Nyirazinyoye found that some 
genocide-rape survivors in southern Rwanda joined associations and deployed a variety of 
coping mechanisms to continue living despite their horrific experiences during the genocide.78 In 
my research with grassroots women’s organizations in southern Rwandan and national women’s 
organizations based in Kigali, I also found that joining women’s associations brought solace to 
many genocide survivors, genocide widows, and other women whose husbands died.79  
Some sexual violence survivors sought to have children outside of marriage as another 
form of consolation and as a way to normalize their situation in the community. In 2013, one 
genocide survivor in the late stages of her battle with AIDS acquired through rape in the 
genocide explained, ‘I knew no man could take me likes this. But I couldn’t stand the idea of 
being alone in the world. So, I sought to have children through other means [than marriage].’80 
Other sexual violence survivors rejected the idea of marriage because of a lingering distaste for 
men.81 These women sought to raise children as single mothers either through adoption or 
through sexual encounters with men.82 
 
Silenced Voices: Sexual Violence Survivors Omitted from the Public Discourse  
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Social interventions in postgenocide Rwanda focused mostly on Tutsi victims leaving other rape 
survivors to cope on their own. Rape survivors who do not fit the Hutu-perpetrator/Tutsi-victim 
dyad remained mostly silent because their experiences did not fit the dominant paradigm of 
Rwandan history promoted by the RPF government.83 Hutu women raped by FAR soldiers or 
Interahamwe militiamen during the civil war or genocide did not dare speak out publically 
because they risked not only disbelief (because Hutu women are not perceived as genocide 
targets) but also rejection by their husbands and families because of the ‘shame’ of being raped. 
Tutsi women who were coerced into sex or forced into marriage with RPF soldiers had little or 
no access to social services for sexual violence survivors unless they adjusted their narratives and 
called the perpetrators ‘Interahamwe.’ Finally, an unknown number of (Hutu and Tutsi) women 
have remained in marriages that began as ‘forced’ marriages. These women dare not talk about 
how their relationships began for fear of being cast off by their husbands or husbands’ families. 
Like women in post-partition India and Pakistan, these women exercise their agency to remain in 
these marriages because they perceive it as the best option for themselves or their children.84 In 
Punjab, Veena Das found that the social fiction of ‘practical kinship’ allowed raped or forcibly 
married women to be incorporated into families and communities when the women’s natal 
families and communities would have rejected them.85 Hayden found that raped women in 
Bosnia exercised similar agency to find a socially acceptable place for themselves and their 
children in the aftermath of the conflict.86  
Notwithstanding the individual and social silence surrounding these issues, silence should 
not be mistaken for secrecy. Even though many rape survivors and women in ‘forced marriages’ 
remain silent about their experiences, family and community members often know about these 
women and girls’ sexual assaults. Given the public nature of genocide rapes and sexual 
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enslavement during the genocide, community members are often aware that certain women were 
raped or held in sexual slavery or that some women’s marriages began in questionable 
circumstances. Social silence on these matters helps preserve the women’s dignity on the one 
hand and avoids reopening familial and community conflict on the other hand. Yet silence may 
also increase or prolong rape survivors’ suffering. 
The voices of sexual violence survivors who have not sought support through 
associational life have rarely been heard. Researchers use convenience samples drawn from 
associations whose membership is pre-identified as sexual violence survivors as a way to 
conquer the nearly insurmountable challenge of recruiting research participants into a study with 
numerous privacy, confidentiality, and psychological risks. Most studies conducted on sexual 
violence during the genocide in Rwanda relied on this strategy to recruit interviewees.87 Despite 
its benefits this recruitment strategy creates a sampling bias due to the de facto exclusion of 
sexual violence survivors who are not members of associations. In addition, it creates an artificial 
situation where interviewees may feel compelled to explain or justify their membership in these 
associations while giving their testimony.88 In The Men Who Killed Me, Anne-Marie de 
Brouwer, Sandra Ka Hon Chu, and Samer Muscati’s study, these kinds of assertions appear 
frequently in the published narratives.89 While this theme can be identified as an artifact of their 
sampling strategy, it is impossible to detect other ways that the narratives or testimony of sexual 
violence survivors may have been influenced by a sampling bias or the research context. 
Ethnographic research can sometimes overcome this obstacle. Some advantages of 
ethnography are the long-term presence of the researcher in the field and the more open-ended 
inductive research questions that can open doors to harder to detect phenomenon. In the course 
of fieldwork over a fifteen-year timespan, a handful of sexual violence survivors (or their 
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families) shared their stories, or parts of their stories, with me. Most of these survivors do not 
belong to associations. Their experiences of sexual violence remained an individual (or family) 
secret. A striking common theme of their narratives is that they do not position themselves as a 
member of one or more groups, rather their individual stories serve as ‘a counter memory to 
official hegemonic history,’ as M. Hirsch and V. Smith describe some women’s memory 
narratives. 90 These survivors’ narratives emphasized sexual survivors’ existence at the margins 
of social acceptability. Yet, rather than remain captives of a gendered social classification system 
that defines sexual violence survivors as morally tainted, these survivors refocused their lives 
and agency on their children, including those born of rape.  
An ethnographic approach allows researchers to explore the ambiguity of sexual violence 
during conflict by uncovering survivors hidden by hegemonic public discourses about conflict 
and by gathering data on female sexual agency and consensual sexual activity in conflict zones. 
Since the majority of postgenocide interventions for sexual violence survivors in Rwanda 
assisted mostly Tutsi victims or Hutu genocide widows, many (perhaps even most) sexual 
violence survivors remained hidden by the public discourse on sexual violence, by their own 
shame, and by the cultural requirement for silence in matters of sexual violence. The assumption 
that European or North American models of sexual consent are relevant to other contexts ignores 
significant differences in the social construction of sexuality and marginalizes emic cultural 
models. As Dianne Otto asserts, conflating all forms of sex in conflict zones as harm undermines 
women’s and children’s rights because it reinforces ‘conservative hierarchies of gender and 
sexuality’ and ‘diverts attention … from the searing poverty that characterizes transitional post-
conflict societies.’91 Initiating sexual encounters can be a matter of rational choice, a coping 
strategy in the difficult economic circumstances that arise in the aftermath of violent conflict and 
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genocide. Furthermore, it can be argued that the question of sexual consent and rape in Europe 
and North America still remains unresolved.92 In conflict zones, some women and girls initiate 
sexual relationships out of sexual desire, as a means to secure their own or their families’ 
survival, or because they face a choiceless decision whereby other options either do not exist or 
are less desirable. Finally, many of the dominant research methods on sexual violence during 
conflict detach the question of female sexual consent from the cultural historical context and 
political economy of poverty that structures women’s agency and limits their options. 
This case study points to the need for more open frameworks for confronting instances of 
sexual violence during violent conflict, ones that make it possible for more victims to come 
forward for medical, psychological and social support. Furthermore, it points to the need to 
address the structural violence of wartime political economies that leave poor women and girls 
vulnerable to sexual exploitation and trafficking because they face choiceless decisions involving 
their or their families’ survival. As Soh pointed out in the case of Japan’s comfort stations during 
WWII, ‘the comfort system encompassed both commercial and criminal sex’ (emphasis in 
original).93 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on gender-based and sexual 
violence in conflict zones as well as the U.N. Secretary-General’s 2003 Bulletin on the sexual 
conduct of peacekeepers are important steps in the right direction.94 Yet as Otto notes, the 
directives outlined in the secretary-general’s bulletin rob women, as well as male peacekeepers, 
of their sexual agency.95 Otto further argues there is a need to examine the real differences 
between women’s ‘experiences of consensual and nonconsensual sexual conduct, no matter how 
fine those distinctions are.’96 Thus, human rights lawyers and academic researchers should 
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